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Abstract 
This paper considers the current proposals by the World Bank to curb the potential for 
‘free riding’ in relation to financial support and multilateral debt relief to low-income 
countries. Measures to address the ‘free rider’ issue will form a pivotal plank in the World 
Bank’s future strategy towards low-income borrowing members and will also inform 
some of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s policies in this respect. This paper 
analyses the proposals in light of current trends in development financing policy and 
practice, particularly the shifting patterns of official and private financial flows to 
developing countries, and demonstrates the disjuncture between the conceptual approach 
of the Bank and Fund to the issue of ‘free riding’ and their operational practice over the 
past two decades. It is argued here that the Bank proposals are less motivated by a 
concern over the future debt sustainability of their low-income borrowers but by the 
realpolitik and financial exigencies facing the Bretton Woods institutions today. 
Consequently, the measures proposed are not only operationally flawed but represent 
instead new mechanisms to continue binding IDA countries to financing flows – and 
thereby financial discipline – by the Bank and the Fund during a time where these 
institutions are struggling to maintain their operational relevance and political legitimacy. 
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Introduction 
 
The World Bank1 is currently developing operational proposals to discourage what the 
institution perceives as the problem of ‘free riding’ in relation to World Bank financial 
support to low-income member states. ‘Free riding’, defined by the International 
Development Association (IDA), the Bank’s concessional lending arm, as the ‘cross-
subsidization through IDA grants of other creditors offering non-concessional terms to 
grant-eligible countries’ (IDA, 2006: para 2), is becoming an increasingly critical issue in 
the debate on debt relief and financing for low-income countries at the Bretton Woods 
institutions.  
 
With the joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt sustainability 
framework (DSF) now forming a vital plank in the assessment of IDA grant eligibility of 
IDA members, and with the anticipated increase in fiscal space created in countries 
eligible for debt relief, both under the existing Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative and the new Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)2, the issue of non-
concessional creditors benefiting from IDA financing has become a central concern for 
the institutions, notably the IDA. 
 
The World Bank has presented its interest in the issue of ‘free riding’ as one primarily 
motivated by concern for the debt sustainability of member states, particularly those 
whose debt ratios are lowered upon the cancellation of multilateral and bilateral debt.  
Accordingly, the Bank notes in IDA’s outline of modalities for the MDRI that Bank 
executive directors and IDA deputies have ‘expressed concern that the [lower risk of 
debt distress] should not lead beneficiary countries to immediately begin re-accumulating 
debt levels that could become unsustainable’ (IDA, 2005: para 33).  
 
This paper considers the background to the World Bank’s concern with ‘free riding’ 
behaviour and the Bank’s proposals to deal with the issue, as outlined in its staff paper 
                                                 
1 The term ‘World Bank’ and ‘Bank’ in this paper refers to both the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), with the term ‘IDA’ 
used where there is a need to denote the Association specifically. 
2 The MDRI, initially proposed by the G8 countries in July 200,5 is aimed at providing 100 percent 
cancellation of all debt owed by eligible countries to three multilateral institutions – the World Bank, the 
IMF and the African Development Fund (AfDF). Countries must reach HIPC completion point and fulfil 
other criteria to be eligible for relief under the MDRI. Implementation modalities are specific to each of 
the three institutions involved. 
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entitled ‘IDA Countries and Non-Concessional Debt: Dealing with the ‘Free Rider’ 
Problem in the Context of IDA 14 Grants’3 which was released in February this year 
(IDA, 2006). This paper challenges the premise of the IDA’s proposals and argues 
against their operationalisation, particularly the plan to link the contracting of new 
financing from alternative sources by IDA countries to their eligibility for grant financing 
and the proposal to further limit countries in breach of ‘concessionality benchmarks’ to 
other official sources of financing.  
 
It is argued here that these proposals do not create ‘incentives to discourage non-
concessional borrowing’ and prevent the re-accumulation of debt, as suggested by the 
Bank (IDA, 2006: para 4), but are instead new mechanisms to continue binding IDA 
countries to financing flows – and thereby financial discipline – by the Bank and the 
Fund. This reflects a policy trend currently prevalent within the Bretton Woods 
institutions at a time when the institutions are struggling to maintain their rapidly 
diminishing relevance today, facing net negative inflows resulting from the sidelining of 
the institutions by middle-income developing countries and the graduation of low-
income countries from their multilateral debt. 
 
Thus, this paper argues that the proposals put forward by the World Bank (and 
peripherally by the IMF) to curb incidences of ‘free riding’ must be placed in the context 
of current developments in the global political economy, notably in the context of the 
shifting patterns of development finance flows and the growth and availability of new 
sources of development finance for developing countries. The overarching motivations 
of the Bretton Woods institutions must be kept in mind when considering the 
aforementioned proposals. 
 
 
Section 1: ‘Origins’ of the ‘Free Rider’ Issue in Bank and Fund Operational 
Policy 
 
The World Bank’s current preoccupation with the issue of ‘free riding’ stems from the 
terms of financing under the IDA’s 14th Replenishment, the process of which was 
                                                 
3 This paper is available on file with the author. 
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completed in April last year, and which will apply to all IDA financing from 2005 to 
2008. 
 
IDA 14 introduced a new system for allocating grants4 to IDA members which included 
an assessment of the countries’ risk of debt distress as determined by the joint Bank and 
Fund debt sustainability framework. The final report of the 14th replenishment 
negotiations concluded that: 
 
…debt sustainability will be the basis for the allocation of rants to IDA-only 
countries in IDA-14 … under the new grant allocation system, the share of 
grants in total IDA financing will emerge from a country-by-country analysis 
of the risk of debt distress. 
 
Participants broadly endorsed the Joint Bank-Fund debt sustainability 
framework (DSF) as the analytical underpinning for the link between debt 
sustainability and grant eligibility … (IDA, 2005b: paras 70 – 71). 
 
Debt Sustainability Framework 
 
The DSF, approved by the Bank and Fund Executive Boards in 2005, is intended to 
assess countries’ ability to sustain its debt burden and ‘to reduce the accumulation of 
future debts to unsustainable levels’ (Kappagoda and Alexander, 2004) and aimed at 
informing the financing policies of the Bank and the Fund in relation to their low-
income members. The DSF calculates a country’s capacity to absorb new borrowings 
based on countries’ 1) indicative policy-dependent external debt thresholds; 2) debt 
sustainability analyses and associated distress tests; and 3) appropriate borrowing and 
lending strategy that limits the risk of debt distress (IDA, 2006: para 1; IMF and IDA, 
2004a: para 2; IMF and IDA, 2004b: para 3).  
 
                                                 
4 The practice of allocating grants instead of loans to borrowing member states was only introduced under 
the 13th Replenishment although under IDA 13, grants were allocated on a ‘multiple, special purpose 
criteria’ which applied to all borrowers (with a cap of 40 percent) without distinction with regards to debt 
service (IDA, 2005: para 70; Kappagoda and Alexander, 2004: para 1). As a result, ‘the level of grants in 
IDA 14 will be an outcome of [the DSF] and not predetermined as in IDA 13 when a cap of 40 percent 
was placed for each country’ (Kappagoda and Alexander, 2004: para 3). 
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The IDA deputies, in their negotiations for its14th replenishment, adopted the ‘first 
pillar’ of the DSF as the conceptual framework on which to assess an IDA member’s 
level of debt distress in determining the allocation of funds to each members, namely in 
the determination of the ‘grant-loan’ mix of financing, with utilisation of the ‘second 
pillar’ contingent upon the development of its operational guidelines by the Bank and the 
Fund (IDA, 2006: para 1; IDA, 2005b: para 73). 
 
In other words, the IDA will use the debt threshold analysis ‘to determine grant eligibility 
among its borrowers, with countries at a high risk of debt distress receiving primarily 
grant financing from IDA’ (IMF and IDA, 2004a: para 4). A central element of this 
analysis is the linking of ‘the risk of debt distress to the quality of policies and institutions 
in low- income countries’, taking into account ‘countries’ policies and institutions as well 
as their vulnerability to exogenous shocks’ in the evaluation of debt sustainability (IDA, 
2004: para 4). 
 
Under the DSF, a country’s vulnerability to debt distress is calculated using three debt 
ratios, using a) the net present value (NPV) of public and publicly guaranteed external 
debt to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP); b) the ratio of this debt to exports; 
and c) the ratio of debt service on this debt to exports (Kappagoda and Alexander, 2004; 
Oddone, 2005: 5). Debt ratio thresholds are established for each of the three country 
clusters determined by countries’ performance under the Bank’s Country Institutional 
and Policy Assessment (CPIA)5, with countries grouped according to their ranking as 
either ‘poor’, ‘medium’ or ‘strong’ performers (IDA, 2004: para 8, Table 1). The matrix 
table looks as follows: 
 
Performance Category Debt to Debt-Service Thresholds (%) 
 NPV of debt-to-GDP NPV of debt-to-exports Debt service-to-exports 
Weak (CPIA <3.25) 30 100 15 
                                                 
5 The CPIA is an evaluation of World Bank borrowing members’ current country and institutional 
framework. For each of its 136 borrowers, the Bank ‘performs an annual CPIA rating that produces an 
overall performance ranking for each borrowing government … based on assessments of each country’s 
governance as well as its economic, structural, social and public reform policies’ (Alexander, 2004). 
Countries are rated in accordance with their performance in 16 criteria, grouped into four clusters – 
‘economic management’, ‘structural polices’, ‘policies for social inclusion and equity’ and ‘public sector 
management and institutions’ – and the overall score is derived from the average of ratings for each cluster 
(World Bank, 2005: paras 1 – 16). The CPIA informs the Bank’s financing and technical assistance 
portfolio for each country, feeding into both the Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) for all borrowers and 
the performance-based allocations (PBAs) for IDA borrowers. Only the ratings for IDA borrowers are 
publicly disclosed (ibid: para 16). 
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Medium 
(3.25<CPIA<3.75)   
40 150 20 
Strong (CPIA>3.75) 50 200 25 
 Source: IDA, 2004 
 
Countries’ risks of debt distress are then calculated by comparing their relevant 
thresholds to those established in their country grouping and risk is classified using a 
‘three category, ‘traffic light’ system’ with ‘green light’ signalling a low risk of debt 
distress, ‘yellow light’ signalling medium risk of debt distress and ‘red light’ signalling a 
high risk of debt distress (IDA, 2006: para 8; IDA, 2004: Box 1; Oddone, 2005: 5).  
 
IDA 14’s Grant Allocation System 
 
Under IDA’s new allocation system, countries with a ‘green light’ –  with indicators 
below the threshold – are considered sufficiently capable of undertaking more debt in the 
form of concessional lending so countries are allocated 100 percent credits (IDA, 2006: 
8; Oddone, 2005: 5). Countries with a ‘yellow light’ – with debt ratios at the limit of the 
thresholds – are allocated a 50/50 mix of grants and credits while countries whose debt 
ratios exceed the threshold – ‘red light’ countries – are deemed unsuitable for any further 
debt and are therefore allocated 100 percent grants (ibid). 
 
One of the central objectives of the DSF is to link policy and institutional performance 
of countries, including in areas such as governance and structural reform, to the 
assessment of debt sustainability and, consequently to reward ‘good’ performers with 
more flexible modes and relatively higher volumes of financing. Countries with ‘good 
policies’ therefore are considered at lower risk of debt distress and are therefore 
considered much better equipped to handle more loans while countries with ‘bad 
policies’ are considered at high risk of debt distress and should not be given any more 
loans but grants. Hence, a ‘country with low risk of debt distress, however, should be in a 
position to obtain more of its resources in the form of loans, implying higher nominal 
transfers for a given grant-equivalent’ (IMF and IDA, 2004: para 43).  
 
However, the Bank and Fund do not view the financing implications of the DSF as 
either ‘rewarding’ or ‘punishing’ high risk countries (IMF and IDA, 2004b: paras 42 – 
43). Instead, the Bank and Fund are of the view that: 
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Under this framework, countries with sound policies would receive a mix of 
loans and grants that would be consistent with their policy performance and 
their risk of debt distress. Provided a country’s policies are considered 
appropriate, the legacy of a high debt burden or vulnerability to shocks 
would not be a justification for denying it resources. Instead, the overall 
allocation of grant resources … would need to be based on policies and other relevant 
criteria (ibid, emphasis added). 
 
Consequently, the DSF and the IDA’s new grant eligibility system will prevent high-risk 
countries (with presumably a poor policy and institutional environment) from receiving 
more financing as compared to a ‘strong’ performer or country with low risk of distress, 
even though these countries will receive more ‘concessional’ financing in the form of 
grants rather than repayable loans.  
 
A calculation by the European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad) suggests 
that while ‘the worst performers get the cheapest money, namely IDA grants’, this 
discount is abated by a 20 percent upfront charge on all grant financing, leading to a 
hypothetical situation where ‘[a] country which would have received US$ 500 million in 
loans, will, if classified as a ‘poor performer’ by the [international financial institutions], 
receive only US$400 million in grants’ (Oddone, 2005: 8; see also Kappagoda and 
Alexander, 2004: para 46).  
 
This significant decline in concessional financing, according to Eurodad, will exacerbate 
existing resource gaps in low-income countries with the likelihood of forcing countries 
‘to either turn to less concessional – or even market-based – finance’ to close the 
resource gaps or to ‘cut essential public services’ (Oddone, 2005: 8). 
 
Grants and ‘Free Riding’ 
 
It is this ironic situation, coupled with the fact that grant-eligible countries will see their 
debt sustainability indicators improve as a result of contracting less debt, which has led to 
the IDA’s concern over the ‘free rider’ issue. In its paper considering the financing terms 
of IDA 14, the Bank notes that ‘[a] possible side effect of the provision of IDA grants to 
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countries with a medium or high risk of debt distress is that these countries ‘space for 
borrowing’ from other sources – including export credit agencies – may expand’ (IDA, 
2004: para 16). The Bank acknowledges that the contraction in financing flows to ‘yellow’ 
or ‘red light’ countries under the new grant allocation system may result in countries 
expanding ‘non-concessional borrowing in the wake of a reduced share of credits in their 
IDA portfolios’ (ibid).  
 
This, according to the Bank, may result in the increase in the risk of debt distress for 
countries concerned, but equally as importantly, lead to other creditors taking advantage 
of the IDA’s financial ‘subsidies’ to these countries. It notes that ‘if the provision of IDA 
grants frees up space for increased borrowing from other sources, then IDA, would, in 
effect, be subsidizing other lenders at the expense of its future financial strength’ (ibid). 
This concern over its financial future speaks volumes about the Bank’s real reason for 
placing primacy on the issue of ‘free riding’, as will be discussed further below). 
 
Consequently, donor countries had, during the IDA replenishment process, called on the 
Bank staff to develop specific proposals to deal with the ‘free rider’ problem, to be 
presented to the Executive Board by the end of the 2005 financial year (IDA, 2005b: 
para 74). Specifically, the Bank was called upon to devise a mechanism ‘whereby a 
country could cease to be eligible for grants if its government or other public sector 
entities contract or guarantees new loans from alternative sources of financing which 
threaten to defeat the debt sustainability objective that IDA grants are intended to 
achieve’ (ibid). The aforementioned staff paper is a response to this request and was 
considered by the IDA executive directors at an informal meeting in March this year.  
 
‘Free Riding’ and Debt Relief 
 
Since the request for proposed modalities on linking incidences of ‘free riding’ with grant 
financing, the imperative to curb such ‘free riding behaviour’ has increased with the 
inception of the MDRI and, while the paper does not address the ‘free rider’ issue in the 
context of debt relief, it is expected that further proposals developed from the paper will 
apply to countries eligible for such relief under the MDRI, as alluded to by the 
aforementioned IDA staff paper on ‘free riding’ (IDA, 2006), by the IDA’s paper 
outlining the implementation modalities for the MDRI (IDA, 2005a); and by Bank 
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president Paul Wolfowitz in his statements to the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMFC) and Development Committee at the Bank and Fund spring meetings 
this year.  
 
For the IDA, the potential for debt relief qualifying countries to contract new, non-
concessional loans is very real as ‘their debt ratios will be brought down to much lower 
levels post-MDRI relief’ and ‘will, in most cases, be below that of most middle-income 
countries’ (IDA, 2005a: para 43 – 45). With their debt indicators well below the 
thresholds established by the DSF, the IDA considers that debt cancellation ‘significantly 
amplifies the potential scope for irresponsible borrowing (and lending) behaviors’ (ibid: 
para 45).  
 
Both the Development Committee and the IMFC, the political oversight committees of 
the two institutions, addressed the problem of debt re-accumulation due to non-
concessional borrowings by HIPC and MDRI-eligible countries in their respective spring 
meeting communiques (Development Committee, 2006: para 7; IMFC, 2006: para 12).  
 
However, only the Development Committee specifically referred to the issue of ‘free 
riding’, linking it once again with its future financial viability, requesting that the Bank 
and Fund further refine the DSF to ‘avoid accumulation of unsustainable debt’ and, ‘in 
this context, ‘to further elaborate and implement an effective approach to deal with the 
‘issue of ‘free-riding’ where non-concessional lenders may indirectly obtain financial gain 
from IDA’s grants and debt forgiveness’ (Development Committee, 2006: para 7, 
emphasis added).  
 
This suggests that the IDA’s interest in the issue may reside more in the institution’s 
concern over its financial future than a genuine concern for debt sustainability and the 
need to meet resource gaps in low-income countries. Moreover, the proposals outlined in 
the staff paper and considered in the next section would involve greater scrutiny by the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and the official development financing 
community over external financing choices of countries, reflecting the Bretton Woods 
institutions, notably IDA’s, interest in maintaining continued relevance among, if not 
control over, developing countries. 
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Section II:  IDA Proposals for Anti-‘Free Riding’ Measures 
 
Efforts by the World Bank to design measures to curb ‘free riding’ risks in the context of 
IDA financing are, as noted in the previous section, driven by two objectives as stated by 
the institution. Firstly, a concern over the debt sustainability of IDA borrowing members 
resulting from the undertaking of new non-concessional lending and the accumulation of 
non-concessional debt; and, secondly, but more importantly, institutional unease about 
the potential financial benefit reaped by non-concessional official and commercial 
creditors at the expense of the Association’s future financial viability. 
 
Consequently, the Bank is condemnatory of ‘non-concessional lenders [who] obtain 
financial gain from IDA’s debt forgiveness, grants and concessional financing activities 
without paying for it … because it means that creditors, rather than the IDA recipient 
country, are receiving at least part of the benefit of IDA grants, and the development 
effectiveness of IDA is thereby reduced’ while at the same, ‘countries indebtedness 
would not decline’ (IDA, 2006: para 7). 
 
For the Bank, the potential for ‘free riding’ by non-concessional lenders is expected to 
increase with the implementation of the grant allocation system, and debt relief, 
discussed above, as fiscal space is freed up in grant or debt relief-recipient countries and 
the risk of default by these countries on new borrowings is reduced.  
 
Although grant-eligible countries under the DSF and IDA grant allocation system are at 
medium or high risk of debt distress, the Bank fears that ‘high debt ratios do not 
necessarily deter other creditors from providing non-concessional debt’ as ‘the prospects 
for repayment are improved by the overall reduction in a country’s debt obligations 
represented by IDA grants’ (ibid: paras 9 – 10)6. The creditworthiness of these countries 
thus increases in private financial markets with the reduction in debt stock. 
 
                                                 
6 According to the staff paper, 33 percent of public and public guaranteed debt of 31 countries classified as 
‘high risk’ of debt distress was non-concessional with only six countries – Angola, Cameroon, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan – accounting for 88 percent of the non-concessional debt 
stock for this group of countries (IDA, 2006: para 9). 
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The Bank also expects the incentives for non-concessional lending to increase with debt 
relief measures under the MDRI and the graduation of countries from an IMF 
programme – in this case, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) – the 
presence of which has deterred non-concessional borrowings due to conditionalities on 
minimum concessionality of newly contracted loans for countries undergoing a PRGF 
operations. As countries begin freeing themselves from the Bretton Woods institutions, 
it appears that the institutions are developing new measures to continue binding 
countries to these institutions. 
 
Two-Fold Response 
 
The Bank’s proposal to address the problem of ‘free riding’ in IDA countries rests on 
two pillars: 1) Increasing surveillance by the IDA, the IMF and other bilateral and 
multilateral creditors of countries’ borrowings, including broadening the acceptance of 
the DSF as an analytical framework for financing policies and deepening borrower 
reporting requirements in existing and new financing agreements; and 2) Linking the 
non-concessional borrowings by countries to disbursements of official financing, 
concessional or otherwise – the Bank terms this as creating ‘incentive’ structures but, as 
discussed below, these proposals can be more appropriately termed ‘punitive’ measures. 
 
1. Increasing Surveillance of Borrowers 
 
According to the Bank, the potential prevalence of ‘free riding’ by non-concessional 
lenders ‘stems from the fact that there is no institutional framework either for a formal 
creditor coordination process or for the prevention of serious breaches of 
concessionality benchmarks by opportunistic commercial lenders’ (IDA, 2006: para 23). 
The IDA sees the problem of official creditor cooperation as a major factor in 
contributing to the accumulation of non-concessional debt by client countries, notably 
the lack of coherence between creditor lending policies towards these countries, enabling 
countries to contract further loans without adherence to minimum thresholds of debt 
sustainability or concessionality benchmarks for new borrowings. 
 
This is worsened, according to IDA, by the limited monitoring of countries’ new 
borrowings by official creditors and the IFIs and the lack of formal or informal linkages 
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with the borrowers’ breach of concessionality and debt sustainability thresholds with 
lending policies of the creditors. As a result of inadequate surveillance of countries’ 
borrowing strategies and the lack of policy coherence among the creditors, countries are 
able to contract new non-concessional loans without jeopardising their existing or future 
concessional financing arrangements. To redress this, the Bank is proposing measures for 
increased oversight of countries’ borrowing policies through a combination of 
multilateral and bilateral measures. 
 
a)  Creditor Coordination 
 
Firstly, the Bank is urging greater coordination among official creditors, including the 
development of a formal mechanism to ensure a collective response from official 
creditors or at least, ‘enhanced creditor coordination around a common approach to 
concessionality’ to discourage borrowers from undertaking non-concessional lending, 
thereby reducing the risk of ‘free riding’ and risk of further debt distress (IDA, 2006: para 
23).  
 
The IMF already plays this gatekeeping role with respect to PRGF countries by 
constituting, as a performance criteria under the programme, a condition that countries 
adhere to minimum thresholds of concessionality (established by the IMF) when 
contracting new loans.  Consequently, ‘the presence of an IMF program has been a 
deterrent for non-concessional borrowing’ (IDA, 2006: para 10). Not only do PRGF 
countries risk jeopardising IMF resources by non-compliance with concessionality 
benchmarks but they also risk the loss of other financing flows from creditors which link 
their lending to an IMF programme when their PRGF goes ‘off track’ (the Fund’s 
‘signalling’ role).  
 
The Bank is proposing that the DSF forms the ‘analytical basis for a common approach 
to concessionality’ and ‘serve as a coordinating tool among creditors’ in order to ‘achieve 
a common understanding of overall concessionality for low-income borrowers’ (IDA, 
2006: para 23 & 25 – 26). It is hoped that this will inform the lending policies of 
creditors, leading to creditors withholding loans if a country’s debt portfolio exceeds the 
concessionality limits of the country concerned. Paris Club creditors have already agreed 
to used the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Assessments in the context of Paris Club 
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reschedulings and the African Development Fund (AfDF) has adopted the DSF as the 
basis for its grant allocation system (ibid: para 26).  
 
The need to establish a common creditor approach to concessionality is crucial, 
according to Bank, particularly at a time when low-income countries are graduating from 
IMF and when ‘the interest of countries’ in the IMF’s new non-financing Policy Support 
Instrument (PSI)7 has not been established (ibid: para 10). The Bank proposes using the 
IMF’s concessionality threshold on new borrowings in PRGF programmes as the 
minimum benchmark for this coordinated approach. The IMF considers loans to be 
concessional if there is a grant element of at least 35 percent based on ‘currency-specific 
commercial interest reference rates (CIRRs)’ (IDA, 2006: Box 1). 
 
The Bank also recommends the adoption of the IMF’s ‘loan-by-loan definition of 
concessionality’ – used by the Fund to judge compliance with the aforementioned 
concessionality conditionality –  to be used as ‘an indicative baseline on which to identify 
actual instances of free riding’ (ibid: para 15). This approach assesses each new loan 
contracted by the borrowing country for degree of concessionality – as opposed to an 
aggregate approach which assesses the overall degree of concessionality of countries’ new 
borrowings – thereby enabling easier detection of instances of ‘free riding’ (ibid: para 15 
– 16). Although not recommending that such a minimum concessionality benchmark 
serve as a formal conditionality for IDA assistance, the Bank suggests that it be ‘used to 
flag the need for an internal discussion about an appropriate IDA response’ (ibid: para 
15). 
 
b) Greater Scrutiny of New Borrowings 
 
The ‘loan-by-loan’ definition of concessionality, if adopted by the IDA and other 
bilateral and multilateral financiers, requires greater monitoring of new borrowings by the 
                                                 
7 The PSI, introduced by the IMF in October 2005, is a non-lending policy instrument which is designed 
for countries which do not want or need Fund financial support. The instrument is voluntary and enables 
the Fund to monitor and evaluate the economic policies of the country involved, similar to its role under a 
traditional Fund programme such as the PRGF. As this device would be utilised as a Fund endorsement of 
member policies for the purposes of signalling ‘economic health’ to other creditors and donors, countries 
would have to comply with Fund conditionalities on structural and macroeconomic policy reform in the 
same manner as it would a conventional Fund programme but without the possibility of withdrawal of 
funds. Currently Nigeria and Uganda have adopted the PSI and Tanzania will do so upon the completion 
of its PRGF in August. See for example, IMF (2005). The PSI therefore effectively makes the Fund a credit 
ratings agency vis-à-vis low-income countries ! 
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client countries in order for these creditors to assess breaches of concessionality and 
detect instances of ‘free riding’. A quarterly ‘loan-by-loan accounting’ of all new public 
sector loans contracted or guaranteed by countries undergoing an IMF programme is 
already part of the countries’ reporting obligations to the Fund (IDA, 2006: para 15).  
 
Meanwhile, the general conditions in IDA financing agreements include an obligation on 
the part of the recipients to furnish to IDA all such information as IDA reasonably 
requests on the ‘financial and economic conditions in its territory, including its balance of 
payments and its external debt’ (ibid: para 8; IDA, 2005c: Article IV, Section 5.01). The 
Bank’s Operational Policy 14.10 on ‘External Debt Reporting and Financial Statements’ 
also provides that countries provide quarterly reports detailing ‘information on each new 
commitment of a public or publicly guaranteed debt received during the period’ (IDA, 
2006: para 18; also World Bank, 1999: para 3(b)). 
 
The Bank is proposing that the reporting requirements under OP 14.10 be strengthened 
compel countries to provide the requisite data as well as for the instituting of additional 
reporting criteria, requiring IDA borrowers to notify the Association of ‘any planned 
non-concessional borrowing’ beyond its current ex-post reporting required under OP 
14.10 (ibid: para 31). 
 
The staff paper has therefore proposed that all new IDA grant agreements ‘include a 
covenant which would require a country to notify IDA of any planned non-concessional 
borrowing at least 3 months in advance of contracting such borrowing’ (ibid: para 31). 
This would allow the IDA to tailor an appropriate response to what it may perceive as 
incidences of ‘free riding’ or if the debt contracted will lead to further risk of debt 
distress. 
 
 
2. Linking Non-Concessional Borrowing to Concessional Financing 
 
For the Bank, increased scrutiny of low-income countries’ non-concessional borrowings 
and greater creditor coordination, as outlined above, can only deter incidences of ‘free 
riding’ if there is a link between the assumption of such debt by such countries and 
concessional financing from bilateral and multilateral financiers. As such, the IDA staff 
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paper argues that these efforts ‘need to be combined with an immediate focus on 
borrowers’ behavior’, namely financial ‘incentives’ to discourage countries from 
‘engaging in non-concessional borrowing’ (IDA, 2006: para 30).  
 
For IDA grant-eligible countries, the Bank is proposing that countries be made to forfeit 
some of their concessional financing if they do not adhere to the concessionality 
benchmarks established by the IDA, either institutionally or in concert with other 
bilateral and multilateral financiers. As such, the recommendation of the staff paper is to 
reduce the nominal grant allocation of IDA borrowers breaching minimum 
concessionality thresholds (ibid: paras 30 – 38). This is preferred to the other option of 
varying the terms of the assistance given to the affected countries by adjusting its 
concessionality back to credit level and to suspend future grant financing to the countries 
as it is argued that this would increase the countries’ risk of debt distress (ibid: paras 32 – 
33). 
 
The proposal outlined in the IDA staff paper is, for the IDA to reduce nominal grant 
allocations to countries ‘with confirmed breaches of the concessionality benchmark’ by 
20 percent (ibid: para 35). The reduction will bring the grant allocations down ‘by the 
present value of repayments under a regular IDA credit’, thereby eliminating the subsidy 
of the IDA 14 grant allocation system which transfers to grant-eligible countries ‘more 
IDA resources in present value terms than what would be required to ensure cost 
equivalence between a grant and a regular IDA credit’ (ibid: para 37).  
 
Therefore, it is proposed that for ‘small and occasional breaches’ of concessionality 
thresholds, countries would face a 40 percent reduction in grant allocations (20 percent 
on top of the initial 20 percent discount under the grant allocation system – see 
discussion in Section II) (ibid: Box 1). This reduction will be determined on a case-by-
case basis by the IDA management, taking into account the seriousness and the size of 
the new non-concessional borrowing relative to the country’s IDA allocation, the merits 
of the loan in question, and the country’s debt carrying capacity’ (ibid: para 36). For 
‘more serious or prolonged breaches’, the IDA may apply higher reductions on countries’ 
grant allocations or applying these discounts for a number of years, and in the most 
serious cases, it is proposed that ‘Management could consider disengaging from the 
country’ (ibid: paras 36 – 37). 
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Additionally, the paper suggest that where non-concessional borrowing may indicate 
‘related governance problems’, this may be ‘captured by IDA’s performance-based 
allocation system’, resulting in further cuts as a consequence of ‘lower performance-
based allocations’ (ibid: para 36). The Bank hopes that these proposals may provide 
deterrents to IDA countries which seek out non-concessional borrowing and thus reduce 
the incidences of ‘free riding’ by minimising the demand for such loans. 
 
 
Section III: Critique of IDA Proposals 
 
The preceding two sections have outlined the origins of the ‘free rider’ problem in World 
Bank and IMF operational policy, namely in their financing support to highly indebted, 
low-income countries, and IDA proposals for resolving the problem, at least in relation 
to grant-eligible IDA borrowers. These proposals are expected to be refined in the 
period leading up to the Bank and Fund annual meetings in September and may be 
further elaborated to take into the potential of ‘free riding’ under the MDRI, as alluded 
to in the discussion above.  
 
This section evaluates the issue of ‘free riding’, as problematised by the Bank (and to a 
limited extent, the Fund) and the Bank’s proposals to redress the problems in the context 
of IDA member countries. 
 
This critique of the Bretton Woods institutions’ approach to the issue of ‘free riding’ is 
centred on two grounds: 1) the incoherence and inconsistency of the Bank and Fund’s 
conceptual problematisation of the issue of ‘free riding’ in the context of development 
financing; and 2) the operational deficiencies of the proposed modalities for dealing with 
the ‘free rider’ question in relation to development financing policies and practice.  
 
Underpinning these arguments is the overarching critique of this paper that the concern 
of the Bank and the Fund on the issue of ‘free riding’ and the accumulation of non-
concessional debt by their borrowing members and the attendant proposals to redress 
the problem, are driven less by a considered disquiet about the ability of countries’ debt 
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sustainability than about the financial and policy relevance of the Bretton Woods to 
developing member countries in today’s global economy. 
 
 
1. Problematisation of non-concessional loans ignores historical practice 
 
Central to World Bank and IMF’s arguments for measures to address the ‘free rider’ issue 
in the context of development financing is the concern that the institutions may be 
subsidising the exercise of imprudent borrowing and lending, notably, that fear that non-
concessional creditors may take advantage of the grant and/or debt relief-eligible 
country’s prospect of future grants and MDRI relief. The increased creditworthiness of 
countries coupled with the potential graduation of some countries from IMF 
programmes and thus, IMF restrictions on non-concessional borrowings, is perceived as 
a lucrative incentive for non-concessional lenders and imprudent borrowers alike to enter 
into non-concessional loan contracts, therefore creating the potential for ‘free riding’ by 
non-concessional creditors. 
 
The Bank and Fund argue that the lower debt burdens of grant and debt-relief-eligible 
countries lead to two potential problems: a) ‘an incentive to overborrow’ on the part of 
the country involved resulting from IDA’s new allocation system which disburses more 
grants to highly indebted countries; and b) the willingness of non-concessional creditors 
to finance unproductive investments with the security of knowing the grant and debt 
relief would enable the country to service its debt (IMF and World Bank, 2006a: para 49).  
 
This problematisation of non-concessional financing as giving rise to the potential of 
‘free riding’ demonstrates institutional amnesia on the part of the World Bank and the 
IMF in the context of their financing policies in at least two regards. Firstly, it ignores the 
historical objective of official development finance, including that of concessional 
financing, as providing a catalyst for private finance, a role that is still pursued by both 
institutions today. Secondly, and relatedly, it also conveniently disregards other existing 
policy and practice of the Bank and Fund which work to effectively subsidise private 
financial flows to developing countries. There is therefore a disjuncture between the 
Bank and Fund’s treatment of the issue of ‘free riding’ and their traditional exhortation 
of public finance serving as facilitators of private capital flows. 
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a) Catalytic role of official development finance 
 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – the original 
‘World Bank’ – was initially established to facilitate capital investments and assist in the 
reconstruction of post-war economies. Former Bank general counsel Ibrahim Shihata 
noted that under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, the institution plays two main 
statutory roles: a) as ‘a financier and promoter of investment of capital, especially private 
foreign investment, for reconstruction and productive purposes in member countries’ 
and b) as ‘a financier [that is] a guarantor of/or a participant in ‘loans and other 
investments’ made by private foreign investors and a direct lender of funds to finance or 
facilitate productive purposes on suitable conditions ‘when private capital is not available 
on reasonable terms’ (Shihata, 2000: 230; see also IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article 
1).  
 
There was therefore a consensus among the Bank’s founding members that the 
institution ‘would not compete with private investors but would provide finance only when there 
was unavailability of private financing on reasonable terms (Akyüz, 2006: 491 – 492, 
emphasis added). According to Akyüz, ‘[t]he rationale for World Bank lending was not 
simply the inadequacy of private capital for financing rapid reconstruction and meeting 
the needs of developing countries but also concern that the terms of private financing 
would not be appropriate for the conditions prevailing in the borrowing countries’ 
(Akyüz, 2006: 492). The purpose for such public financing was also to provide credit to 
countries until they are able to draw upon capital markets for their external financing 
needs but that such financing would be accessed by countries’ creditworthiness and on 
market-based terms, including market-based interest rates.  
 
The rationale for such lending shifted with the advent of the IDA and the provision of 
long-term concessional highly credit to low-income developing countries under the 
auspices of providing finance to meet countries’ ‘developmental requirements on terms 
which are more flexible and bear less heavily on the balance of payments than those of 
conventional loans’ (IDA Articles of Agreement, Article 1). This shift in focus also 
reflected the Bank’s increasing association with the private sector and the development 
of the Bank’s role as a stimulator for private financing flows, primarily through market-
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friendly structural adjustment programmes and non-financing activities (see Akyüz, 2006: 
494 – 495; Shihata, 2000: 231, Rodrik, 1995). 
 
While the success of the catalytic role of multilateral financing is questionable8, the 
Bretton Woods institutions have nonetheless relied upon this rationale for the expansion 
in their mandate and for their policies on access to, the design and terms of financing to 
client member states. Shihata acknowledged that the expansion in the Bank’s activities 
over the period since its inception ‘relied primarily on its role as facilitator and promoter 
of investment and encourager of development’ and this has allowed it to pursue policies 
under the auspices of creating an ‘enabling environment’ for foreign investment and 
private capital (Shihata, 2000: 231). 
 
Over the years, especially since the onset of the debt crisis in the 1980s, there has been 
what Woodward terms as a ‘deliberate paradigm shift’ by the IMF and the World Bank to 
support the facilitation, by public financing, of private capital flows as the primary source 
of development finance for developing countries (see Woodward, 1998: 6 -7). 
Consequently, for the Bretton Woods institutions, the purpose of multilateral financing 
shifted to essentially one that was facilitative of private foreign capital flows, leading to a 
corresponding shift in the operations of the Bank and the Fund, most notably, the 
inception of structural adjustment lending and the pro-market conditions attached to 
such financing (ibid).  
 
The institutions have promoted such open-door policies on the justification that these 
policies and lending from the Bank and Fund increase the creditworthiness of borrowing 
countries in private capital markets, enabling countries to eventually graduate from 
official development financing. For example, proponents of this view have held that by 
‘financing projects that private lenders find too risky, multilateral development banks 
mobilize private capital by improving the risk-return profiles of private investment’ and 
as ‘risk-return profiles of projects depend on the overall policy environment’ of the 
country involved, the use of conditionality may lead to improvements in policymaking as 
well as institutional capacity (Akyüz, 2006: 498). 
 
                                                 
8 Akyuz and Rodrik argue that empirical evidence does not support this role (Akyuz, 2006: 500; Rodrik, 
199522 – 27). 
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The relief of indebted countries from the burden of unsustainable external debt servicing 
and debt stock under the HIPC initiative and the MDRI respectively was also premised 
on the assumption that debt cancellation will not only free up fiscal space for ‘poverty 
reducing’ expenditures but also to increase creditworthiness of countries to borrow from 
private sources to meet developmental targets. As the Bank’s Independent Evaluation 
Group (IEG) has noted – ‘Commercial financing will be essential in the long run for 
expanding HIPC countries’ exports and growth’ (World Bank, 2006a: para 8). 
 
Given this history of Bank and Fund policy and practice, it is difficult to understand why 
the institutions are so particularly concerned with the issue of ‘free riding’ in the context 
of new non-concessional borrowings by its members. While it is acknowledged that 
imprudent borrowing should be discouraged in the context of future debt sustainability, 
the rationale that the fiscal and borrowing space of countries freed up by grant 
allocations and debt relief will give rise to the potential of ‘free riding’ by non-
concessional creditors is at odds with the traditional practice of the Bank and Fund.  
 
The conventional view of the Bank and Fund of official development financing – with its 
element of public subsidy – as the facilitator of private finance contradicts the 
institutions’ current approach to the adoption of non-concessional debt by client 
countries. It appears as if the Bank and the Fund are now competing with private capital and 
even with alternative non-concessional official financing, such as export credit agencies, 
for the business of client countries as they see their own roles diminishing in the wake of 
recent developments. 
 
b) Inconsistent ‘subsidy’ arguments 
 
As discussed above, the Bank and Fund have also expressed concern over the 
subsidisation of non-concessional creditors through the delivery of grant financing and 
debt relief through the reduction of debt default by grant and debt relief-eligible 
countries at the cost of the institutions’, particularly the IDA’s, financial strength. The 
primary driver for measures to curb ‘free riding’ behaviour by non-concessional creditors 
on the part of IDA is the fear that while the IDA will lose resources as a result of lost 
reflows from credit repayments as a result of the shift from loans to grants to eligible 
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countries and debt relief under the MDRI9, non-concessional creditors, including 
commercial lenders as well as official sovereign lenders will benefit financially from the 
same developments. 
 
However, this is again inconsistent with the policy and practice of the Bank and the Fund 
over the last couple of decades, in particular, the subsidisation of the private sector and 
commercial creditors through financing policies. Since the inception of the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1956 and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) in 1988, the World Bank Group has worked closely with the private sector to 
facilitate private capital flows to developing member states. The IFC provides loans to 
private investors in developing countries while the MIGA provides guarantees for 
commercial finance and investment in these countries. This direct support for the private 
sector is aimed at reducing the risks encountered by private finance when investing in 
developing countries and to ‘mobilise commercial flows to these countries rather than to 
provide finance directly’ (Woodward, 1998: 6). 
 
The IMF has also been heavily criticised for its policy of prioritising international capital 
at the expense of the economic and financial needs of its client countries through not 
only its espousal of unbridled deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation policies in 
structural adjustment countries, but also, more importantly, through the bailouts of 
commercial creditors in their financial ‘rescue’ packages to countries experiencing 
financial crises. These bailout operations were designed, inter alia, to ‘keep countries 
current on their debt repayments to private creditors’, creating a problem of ‘moral 
hazard’ – increasing the probability of irresponsible lending – and aggravating market 
failures by cushioning the risk of private creditors in the event of a financial crisis and 
debt default in developing countries (Akyüz, 2006: 498; Akyüz, 2005: 30).  
 
Accordingly, Akyüz argues that ‘bailouts undermine market discipline and encourage 
imprudent lending since private creditors are not made to bear the consequences of the 
risks they take’ (Akyüz, 2005: 30). Instead, the Bretton Woods institutions have been 
complicit in the build-up of unsustainable debt of developing countries via their lending 
practices over the 1980s and 1990s. As Sachs has noted: 
 
                                                 
9 Although this is limited to ancillary costs as compensation for the cost of IDA’s debt relief will be made 
by IDA donors under regular IDA replenishment procedures (IDA, 2005a: para 35). 
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Following the initial onset of the developing country debt crisis in the early 
1980s, many developing countries borrowed heavily from multilateral 
sources in order to finance debt servicing to private creditors, thereby 
shifting the balance of debt from private to public creditors (Sachs, 1998 in 
UNCTAD, 1998: 128). 
 
Consequently, there is very little difference in the ‘free ride’ accorded by these bailout 
operations to private creditors and the ‘free ride’ that the Bank and Fund are worried will 
be given to non-concessional lenders to grant and debt-relief-eligible countries. If the 
Bank and Fund were unduly concerned with private creditors benefiting from public 
money, and with the impact this has on the debt sustainability of countries, the 
institutions should move towards designing orderly debt workouts10 for countries facing 
short-term or prolonged financial crises, including for official debt. This would enable a 
standstill on unserviceable debt on a more equitable basis rather than the current ad-hoc 
debt relief mechanisms which continue to keep countries on a short-leash to these 
institutions and their major shareholders (see for example, Akyüz, 2005: 30 – 31). 
 
The above discussion once again demonstrates the inconsistency in the Bank and Fund’s 
approach to the issue of ‘free riding’ in the context of non-concessional borrowings by 
low-income countries and the disjuncture between the institutions’ critique of the issue 
and its problematisation and the Bank and Fund’s track record in financing policy and 
practice. 
 
2. Operational difficulties with IDA proposals 
 
Aside from fundamental flaws in the conceptual premise framing the issue of ‘free riding’ 
in non-concessional borrowings, there are several operational difficulties with the IDA’s 
design of measures to curb such behaviour by commercial creditors and the assumption 
of unsustainable loans by IDA countries. The three main criticisms of the proposed 
measures are centred on the punitive nature of such a course of action which shifts the 
burden for an effective debt management and external resource mobilisation strategy on 
the highly indebted country. 
                                                 
10 Proposals for these workouts have included the now-shelved Fund-initiated Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) and other proposals along the lines of national bankruptcy laws (see 
Akyüz, 2005: 30 – 31). 
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While the Bank considers such measures as ‘incentives to influence borrowers’ behavior’ 
(IDA, 2006: para 24), these proposals espousing a common creditor approach to 
concessionality and the linking of non-concessional borrowings to the volume of 
concessional official finance read more like punitive deterrents for borrower countries. 
These measures imply increased financial oversight of the public finances and debt 
management policies of client countries by the Bank, Fund and other official creditors 
and greater control over what is a sovereign right of countries to enter into external 
financing agreements. The IDA proposals are aimed at imposing further conditions on 
the use of concessional resources, even when the dwindling volumes of these resources 
have created, and will create as a result of further cuts, the necessity for countries to seek 
alternative sources of financing. 
 
a) Proposals focus on borrower rather than creditor responsibility 
 
The IDA proposals focus inordinately on borrower behaviour rather than on the creditor 
liability. The proposals call for the establishment of greater creditor coherence and 
agreement on minimum concessionality benchmarks but fall short of calling for anything 
more than an informal arrangement. It also does not provide for creditor accountability 
for the contraction of non-concessional loans by affected countries, even if the loan is a 
bilateral credit arrangement and the official creditor is the state or organ of the state that 
is party to the IDA or other multilateral surveillance arrangement.  
 
As Eurodad has pointed out in their comment on IDA’s proposals, there is an iniquity in 
the design of measures which result in the borrower bearing the burnt of punitive 
measures for breaches of concessionality thresholds and the creditor bearing no 
responsibility (Oddone, 2006). While the borrower assumes the ‘punishment’ of reduced 
aid flows as a result of contracting a non-concessional loan which exceeds the minimum 
concessionality benchmark, the creditor assumes little, if any, of the losses, protected by 
the financing agreement entered into for the loan which guarantees its repayments by the 
country regardless.  
 
The IDA proposals are targeted at the demand side of non-concessional financing and 
not at the supply side of such financing and even the effectiveness of these measures are 
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questionable. The Bank admits that there may be cases where it has ‘little leverage to 
reduce instances of free riding, even with strong disincentives’, notably in cases ‘where 
IDA allocation is very small relative to available non-concessional financing sources, 
such as are available for mineral-rich countries’ (IDA, 2006: para 38).  
 
However, it is hoped that these punitive measures linking IDA disbursements to non-
concessional borrowings may deter countries from undertaking non-concessional loans if 
similar measures are adopted by other official creditors or ‘if other donors take these 
IDA measures as a signal for their own grant programs’ (ibid). IDA is therefore 
advocating for other official creditors to withdraw concessional financing from countries 
which IDA have identified as having breached concessionality guidelines and/or where 
incidences of ‘free riding’ have been detected. 
 
In this manner, resource-strapped countries are further penalised for trying to access 
financing for development while at the same time, being subjected to tighter conditions 
for access to existing financing and reduction in official resources, while creditors act 
with impunity and are not subjected to similar disincentives for providing non-
concessional financing.  
 
This is even more acute for commercial creditors who ‘free ride’ as they are less subject 
to the peer pressure that sovereign creditors may be subjected to under the auspices of 
the Bank and Fund or Paris Club coordination mechanisms to assume some 
responsibility for concessionality breaches. The IDA recognises that the ‘mere adoption 
of a common approach to concessionality is unlikely to prevent free riding by 
opportunistic lenders’ as evidenced by the instances of the creditor litigation in the 
context of the HIPC countries (IDA, 2006: para 29). Most commercial creditors have 
failed to commit their share of HIPC relief and ‘more than a few have initiated litigation 
against HIPCs to recover debt’, winning awards of at least US$586 million in nine HIPC 
countries as of 2005’ (World Bank, 2006a: para 2.6).  
 
The HIPC experience has also demonstrated that a ‘common’ mechanism that is 
designed and driven by one set of creditors – the IFIs, led primarily by the Bank and the 
Fund and their major shareholders – and imposed on another set of creditors (namely 
non-Paris Club creditors, and commercial lenders), will not be effective in achieving 
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policy consensus and uniformity in delivery of commitments because of the perception 
of partiality (see Greenhill and Pettifor, 2002; see also World Bank, 2006a: paras 2.1 – 
2.8).  
 
Similarly, under the IDA proposals, it is not only the Bank and the Fund who are setting 
the concessionality benchmarks to be adhered to by other creditors but these institutions 
are also assessing country’s compliance with such benchmarks and debt sustainability 
thresholds under the DSF. It is therefore unlikely, and unsurprisingly so, that these 
measures would be adopted by other official creditors (and less so by commercial 
creditors) aside from possibly the Paris Club creditors who also represent the major 
shareholders of the Bank and the Fund. 
 
b) Exacerbating resource gaps 
 
The proposal to link grant eligibility with the breaches of concessionality benchmarks in 
new borrowings by IDA countries will further exacerbate resource gaps in these 
countries. As discussed in section 1, the new allocation system under IDA 14 which 
provides only grants instead of credits to highly debt distressed countries will result in 
countries receiving fewer resources. Meanwhile, for debt relief-eligible countries, 
implementation of MDRI may also imply further cuts in official development assistance 
as ‘even with full additionality, new IDA commitments to most eligible HIPC countries 
would decrease over the IDA 14, since debt service forgiven is netted out of new 
commitments’ (IDA, 2005a: para 31). In the context of an overall decline in official flows 
to developing countries, including in official development assistance (ODA), IDA 
measures will further limit countries’ access to external financing by circumscribing their 
ability to contract non-concessional loans and/or reducing the volumes of their official 
financial inflows.  
 
The staff paper does not consider the reasons why countries are turning to non-
concessional borrowing as a source of external financing, notably the decrease in and 
volatility of ODA flows and the onerous terms attached to official financing, especially 
from the IFIs. As suggested by Eurodad, the IDA has failed to consider the costs 
associated with conventional financing sources, including inappropriate economic 
conditions attached to such financing, which has prompted IDA countries to seek 
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alternative income streams, including from other official sources such as China (see 
Oddone, 2006; also Eurodad, 2006). 
 
The volatility of aid flows as a revenue stream for developing countries has been well-
researched and documented with empirical work suggesting that aid volatility ‘exceeds 
that of other macroeconomic variables, such as GDP or fiscal revenue’ with aid flows 
being contingent upon the political commitments of donor countries and with large 
temporal gaps between budgeted commitments and actual disbursements (United 
Nations, 2005: 112- 116). This volatility is exacerbated by aid conditionality, including the 
need for IMF approval by most official creditors and specific conditions required by 
donors (ibid: 116), including criteria under IDA’s complex performance-based allocation 
system. 
 
In spite of these considerations, the Bank prefers to assign fault with countries which 
exceed the Bretton Woods institutions’ concessionality benchmarks, arguing that 
reductions in grant volumes are necessary and consistent with the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) ‘since governments who take on irresponsible non-
concessional borrowing are usually not taking into account what is best for the country’s 
long-term poverty reduction goals’ (IDA, 2006: para 35). 
 
Moreover, not only does IDA fail to acknowledge its own complicity in countries’ 
sourcing for alternative sources of financing through its grant allocation framework and 
other aid practices, it does not adequately address the impact of proposed measures on 
countries involved. Although the Bank acknowledges that ‘affected countries may 
attempt to compensate for their reduced IDA allocations by seeking further non-
concessional financing from other creditors’ (ibid: para 39), it does not provide solutions 
to this problem, assuming that countries will have to seek more appropriate financing 
elsewhere or reduce government expenditures as a result of grant cutbacks.  
 
It is interesting to note here that the Fund is not fully supportive of the IDA’s proposals 
to link concessional financing with breaches of concessionality thresholds by countries, 
preferring a focus on improved monitoring and strengthened debt management 
strategies in low-income countries. The Fund’s recent review of the DSF argues that 
measures by ‘a subset of donors, such as IDA’ to reduce financing volumes to ‘countries 
 28
that borrow excessively on commercial terms’ is a ‘less preferable approach’ to addressing the 
issue of debt sustainability (IMF, 2006: para 50, emphasis added). 
 
c) Flawed assessment modalities 
 
The anti-‘free riding’ measures outlined by IDA in its paper are premised upon an 
underlying assumption that borrowing countries and their lenders are not equipped to 
assess the relative risks of their non-concessional financing. There is a paternalism which 
underpins the Bank and Fund’s approach to debt sustainability, particularly in relation to 
the accumulation of non-concessional debt by low-income countries, which assumes that 
only the Bretton Woods institutions have the capacity to assess a country’s debt 
sustainability and ability to assume further financial obligations instead of the country 
itself or international capital markets.  
 
Implicit in the paper is that financial markets do not make competent assessments of 
countries’ debt sustainability or if they do make rational choices to lend to highly 
distressed countries, such lending must be premised only on the improved repayment 
prospects guaranteed by the overall reduction of debt obligations as a result of IDA 
grants and debt relief (see for example, IDA, 2006: para 10). Correspondingly, countries 
are not entrusted with the task of managing their own debt, having to be reigned in by 
IDA disincentive measures and IMF conditionality in order for them not to fall into 
future debt distress. And yet, the efficacy and appropriateness of modalities for assessing 
debt sustainability and concessionality of new borrowings under the auspices of the Bank 
and Fund remain questionable. 
 
Ownership of the DSF resides with the Bank and Fund and not their borrowing 
members. The modalities of assessing debt sustainability under the DSF remain driven 
by the Bretton Woods institutions with little input from borrowing member 
governments. Although countries are made to supply critical financial information about 
their debt status and debt contraction plans, the design of measures on how to deal with 
breaches of debt thresholds and concessionality benchmarks for new borrowings remain 
the purview of the Bank and the Fund using their own criteria for judgment. 
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Furthermore, as various commentators have argued, the concept of ‘debt sustainability’ 
itself remains ‘a highly ambiguous and manipulatable … political notion’ (Callaghy, 2003: 
212).  Quoting a western creditor official, Callaghy has pointed out that debt 
sustainability assessments are more art than science with the political determinants of 
such evaluations as contingent upon the final outcomes as the actual figures determining 
the level of debt distress (ibid: 212 – 213). 
 
The DSF methodology remains undeveloped with only the modalities completed for the 
first pillar of the framework (see section 1). The DSF has been subjected to a host of 
negative critique (see for example, Alexander, 2004; Kappagoda and Alexander, 2004; 
Northover, 2004; Oddone, 2005), the details of which, particularly with regard to specific 
econometric data and methodology, are outside the scope of this paper.  
 
However, one of the chief criticisms levelled at the DSF worth highlighting here is the 
fact that the debt sustainability thresholds are based on the ‘quality’ of the countries’ 
social, economic and even political governance institutions and policies, as assessed by 
their CPIA rankings11. The Bank and Fund view the institutional and policy environment 
as key factors influencing the debt sustainability levels of countries, arguing that 
‘[c]ountries operating in a weaker institutional and policy environment are likely to 
experience debt distress at significantly lower debt ratios, as such countries tend to be 
more prone to misuse and mismanagement of funds and less capable of using their 
resources productively’ (IMF and IDA, 2004b: para 25). 
 
Aside from the questionable decision to include policy and institutional indicators into a 
debt sustainability assessment, commentators have also expressed serious misgivings 
over the adoption of the CPIA as ‘a central determinant of future creditworthiness’ 
(Northover, 2004: 5). The CPIA index has been criticised for its partiality of its 
assessments – relying on the subjective judgments of World Bank staff – and the lack of 
empirical evidence and rigour of the criteria upon which such evaluations are based (ibid; 
also Alexander, 2004: ). As such, the reliance on ‘a weak analytical tool’  (Northover, ibid) 
as forming a significant part of the DSF raises questions about the viability of the DSF 
itself as a mechanism for evaluating the debt distress of countries, and subsequently, for 
determining the concessionality limits of their new borrowings. 
                                                 
11 See discussion in section 1 for details on the CPIA. 
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Conclusion 
 
Measures to address the ‘free rider’ question will form a pivotal plank in the World 
Bank’s strategy towards low-income borrowing members and will also inform some of 
the IMF’s policies in this respect. This paper has considered the proposals in detail, 
placing the measures proposed by IDA in relation to the DSF, IDA’s grant allocation 
system and IDA 14’s replenishment terms as well as with regard to debt relief under the 
MDRI. This paper has further analysed the proposals in light of current trends in 
development financing policy and practice, particularly the shifting patterns of official 
and private financial flows to developing countries, and the demonstrated the disjuncture 
between the conceptual approach of the Bank and Fund to the issue of ‘free riding’ and 
their operational practice over the past two decades. 
 
There appears to be significant inconsistency in the general policies espoused by the 
Bretton Woods institutions and their problematisation of the issue of non-concessional 
borrowing by grant and debt relief-eligible low-income countries. This incoherence must 
be placed within the context of developments in the current global political economy and 
the diminishing relevance of the Bank and the Fund to many developing countries today. 
Such a contextualisation will help explain why these institutions are deeply concerned 
with the potential for non-concessional lenders (and perhaps concessional creditors in 
due course) to assume benefits, if any, of IDA grants and debt relief under the HIPC 
initiative and the MDRI. 
 
The World Bank’s own research in the recently released annual Global Development 
Financing (GDF) report 2006, notes that the net official flows of grants and loans have 
continued to decline in 2005 for the fourth consecutive year and while net disbursements 
of ODA has risen dramatically, most of this reflects Paris Club debt relief to Iraq and 
Nigeria (World Bank, 2006b: 7). The report notes that net official outflows from 
developing countries came to US$71.4 billion, primarily from large repayments of 
middle-income countries to the IMF and large prepayments to bilateral creditors (ibid). 
Due to repayments by Indonesia, Russia, Argentina, Brazil and Turkey in last year, gross 
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lending by the IMF has declined from about US$30 billion in 2002 and 2003 to only 
US$4 billion in 2005 (ibid).  
 
Middle-income countries are also much less reliant on financial flows from official 
northern creditors for financing needs, especially financial support from multilateral 
institutions. While official lending flows have decreased, net flows of private capital – in 
the form of bond issues, bank lending and portfolio equity among others – to developing 
countries have increased dramatically, peaking at US$491 billion in 2005, the highest level 
on record, as middle-income countries’ creditworthiness on the international capital 
markets continue to improve (World Bank, 2006b: 2 & 4).  
 
The growing wealth of these countries have also resulted in the emergence of another 
pattern in global financial flows – rapidly increasing capital flows among developing 
countries. These ‘South-South flows’ have facilitated capital inflows to low-income 
countries as private capital from middle-income countries seek investment in these 
countries with South-South foreign direct investment (FDI) flows constituting 36 
percent of total FDI flows to developing countries in 2003, up from 16 percent in 1995 
(ibid: 1; 107 – 108). Middle-income countries, notably Brazil, Chile, China, India, South 
Africa and Thailand, have also emerged as aid donors, however marginal, providing 
concessional financing (two percent of total ODA), as well as non-concessional export 
credits, to low-income countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa (ibid: 109, Box 4.1). China 
accounted for more than half of concessional lending from developing countries from 
1994 to 2004 according to the GDF (ibid). 
 
Given these developments, it is clear that the Bretton Woods institutions are becoming 
increasingly sidelined in the global economy today. As middle-income countries continue 
to seek alternative sources of financing for development and economic growth and with 
more low-income countries graduating from IMF programmes, the Bank and Fund are 
increasingly anxious about their role in their traditional base of developing countries and 
their financial future. In addition to such international economic developments, internal 
policy shifts, notably that of IDA’s move towards grants from loans, and debt relief 
initiatives threaten the financial strength of the institutions and provide the institutional 
impetus to design methods to maintain both their relevance to and control over their 
borrowing members.  
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Therefore, while the development of the new non-financing PSI at the Fund may serve 
to continue binding low-income countries which may otherwise have graduated from 
Fund programmes after the conclusion of their PRGF operations, the Bank’s proposals 
to curb what it perceives as the ‘free riding’ potential of non-concessional borrowings by 
IDA members may be similarly viewed as a means of maintaining Bank control over 
external financing resources of these countries.  
 
While concern over the debt sustainability of its member countries is warranted, the 
measures outlined by the Bank and the conceptualisation of the problem of ‘free riding’ 
are inconsistent with previous and existing Bank policy and practice and indicates a 
deeper motivation than concern over the risk of debt distress. Instead, the measures 
appear to seek to curtail the right of countries to seek alternative sources of financing, 
with the Bank viewing non-Bank lenders, official or otherwise, as not only potential 
competitors for the business of low-income countries but also as threats to the financial 
integrity and political hegemony of the Bank.  
 
Ultimately, all these measures fail to address the critical twin problems of the debt 
overhang and resource gap faced by many low-income countries. Instead, they reflect the 
institutions’ (and their major shareholders’) efforts to keep these countries on a short 
leash vis-à-vis external financing and the lack of political will to commit to a sustainable 
and equitable programme of debt relief and concessional financing that is not contingent 
upon the political whims of developed countries but focused instead on a systematic 
overhaul of the currently deficient international financial architecture. Any proposals 
outlined by the Bank (and the Fund) to address the issue of ‘free riding’ and non-
concessional borrowing by member states must therefore be analysed in light of these 
considerations. 
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